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Abstract. The formal and computational views of cryptography have
been related by the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway. In their work,
a formal treatment of encryption that uses atomic keys is justified in the
computational world. However, many proposed formal approaches allow
the use of composed keys, where any arbitrary expression can be used
as encryption key. In this paper we consider an extension of the formal
model presented by Abadi and Rogaway, in which it is allowed to use
composed keys in formal encryption. We then provide a computational
interpretation for expressions that allow us to establish the computa-
tional soundness of formal encryption with composed keys.
1 Introduction
Usually, it is necessary to adopt an abstract view of cryptographic oper-
ations (such as message encryption) to make the design and analysis of
cryptographic protocols more manageable.
Two different, but still related abstract views of cryptographic op-
erations –the formal and the computational– have developed separately
in the last years. In the former, the exchanged messages of the protocol
are modelled as formal expressions of a term algebra. The (cryptographic)
operations, such as message pairing and encryption, are modelled as term
constructors. In this setting, an adversary and its abilities can be modelled
in terms of the messages the adversary knows; see for e.g. [11]. Further-
more, the security properties a protocol is supposed to achieve are also
modelled formally [9, 19]. On the other hand, in the computational model,
messages are considered to be (more realistically) bit-strings, while cryp-
tographic operations are seen as functions over these bit-strings. Here, an
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adversary is modelled as any efficient algorithm, while the security prop-
erties of a cryptographic protocol are defined on terms of the probability
of the adversary to perform a succesful attack [13, 5].
Both of the two above models have advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, the formal model allows to reason about cryptographic
protocols more easily and generally. However, such benefits arise from
the adoption of fairly strong assumptions (such as freeness of the term
algebra, and fixing the adversary model). On the other hand, the com-
putational model, by considering messages as bit-strings and modelling
the adversary as any efficient algorithm, provides a more realistic model
and thus offers more convincing security guarantees. However, proving
protocols correct in the computational model is more difficult and less
general than in the formal model.
In the work of Abadi and Rogaway [3], it is shown that if two formal
expressions are similar to a formal adversary, then their corresponding
computational interpretations, represented as bit-strings in the computa-
tional model, are also indistinguishable to any computational adversary.
This result comprises a very important step into relating the formal and
computational model.
Composed Keys. In [3], formal encryption is modelled by using atomic
keys: that is, a formal expression {M}K represents encryption of mes-
sage M with key K, where M is again a formal expression and K is an
atomic symbol representing the cryptographic key. However, considering
only atomic keys in encryption is not sufficient, and sometimes we need to
be able to allow encryption with composed keys, representing non-atomic,
constructed keys. In that setting, the formal language would need to be
able to consider expressions of the form {M}N , where both M and N
are expressions. Considering composed keys as possible encryption keys
is important due to that, in protocol design, it is fairly common to con-
struct symmetric keys from shared secrets and other exchanged data as
part of the protocol run. Examples of this can be found in the work of
Gong [14], and, more recently, in a proposed protocol for achieving private
authentication [1]. Moreover, many “real-world” cryptographic protocols
use composed keys —see, for example SSL 3.0 [12]. Furthermore, in the
formal model, some approaches based on constraint solving have been
designed with specific support of composed keys [18] (this work was sub-
sequently improved in [10]) and, more recently [4].
This paper defines a computational interpretation [[·]] for the operation
{M}N . Briefly, the interpretation [[{M}N ]] consists of encrypting [[M ]] —
the interpretation ofM with a key obtained by applying the random ora-
cle to [[N ]]. So, the interpretation of {M}N is quite intuitive. On the other
hand, this forces us to use the random oracle model as the computational
model. Using a random oracle seems to be necessary, since otherwise the
goodness of keys might be questioned, as well as the independence of
different keys.
We also define a relation ∼= over formal expressions and, as our main
contribution, we show that M ∼= N implies the computational indistin-
guishability of [[M ]] and [[N ]].
Related Work. The work of Abadi and Rogaway [3] was later extended in
Abadi and Ju¨rjens [2] and Laud [15]. In these works, similar soundness
results were obtained for richer formal languages, where instead of consid-
ering values of formal expressions, it is dealt with outputs of programs.
However, differently from the formal language presented in this paper,
both of these extended languages still treat the encryption operation as
using atomic keys.
Micciancio and Warinschi [17] considered the converse of the sound-
ness result (i.e., completeness of the formal language of [3]). In their work,
it is shown that a completeness result can be obtained by considering a
stronger encryption scheme, namely an authenticated encryption scheme.
Further extensions of the seminal work [3] deal with encryption cycles
in expressions. For instance, the expression {K}K contains a trivial cycle:
key K is immediately encrypted with itself. In the computational model,
the security of a traditional encryption scheme can be compromised if an
adversary gets hold of a message containing an encryption cycle. Thus,
in the original work of Abadi and Rogaway, formal expressions were re-
stricted to be cycle free. However, further work of Black et al. [8] and
Laud [16] has shown that, in fact, this discrepancy can be addressed in
two different ways: either by considering a new, stronger security def-
inition of the encryption scheme [8], or by strengthening the adversary
model of the formal model, such that it can be able to “break” encryption
cycles [16].
Recently, Bellare and Kohno [6] have studied the security of cryp-
tosystems against related-key attacks and also provided a construction
of a secure cryptosystem against a certain kind of such attacks. Related
keys are different from composed keys — a related key is something that
is constructed from an already existing good key and some non-key data,
whereas a composed key is constructed from non-key data only.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2 we present the formal language. Then, in
Section 3 we introduce some basic notions of the computational model
that are needed in the sequel, and also present an algorithm for translat-
ing formal expressions into computational [distributions of] bit-strings.
In Section 4, we introduce an equivalence relation ∼= over formal expres-
sions. This equivalence relation ∼= is elaborated and illustrated with some
examples in Section 5. After that, in Section 6 we present the main con-
tribution, a soundness result that relates the formal and computational
models. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Expressions and patterns
Let Bool be the set {0, 1} and let Keys be the set of formal keys — this
is a fixed, infinite set of symbols. Intuitively, elements of Keys represent
cryptographic keys. Also, let Rnd be the set of formal random numbers
— again a fixed, infinite set of symbols disjoint from Keys. The use of
Rnd is needed since usually some of the constructors of formal expressions
(such as encryption) represent probabilistic operations. This means that
if such an operation is executed twice, even with the same arguments, the
results will be different. Thus, the elements of Rnd are used to keep track
which subexpressions of an expression represent the same invocation of
that operation and which subexpressions represent different invocations.
Our set of formal expressions Exp is defined by the following grammar:
M,N ::= b (bit)
| K (key)
| (M,N) (pair)
| {M}rN (encryption) .
Here, b ∈ Bool, K ∈ Keys and r ∈ Rnd. Clearly, we can see that
composed keys are allowed in the encryption operation. As the labels r
are identifiers of invocations of the encryption algorithm, we demand that
whenever we consider two expressions {M}rN and {M ′}rN ′ with the same
label r, then also M =M ′ and N = N ′.
Even though Abadi and Rogaway [3] did not use formal random num-
bers, they assumed that each occurrence of the encryption constructor
represents a different invocation of the encryption operation. Further-
more, the later work of Abadi and Ju¨rjens [2] considered a richer language
in which they also needed to keep track of different invocations. This was
done, similarly to the present work, by using formal random numbers.
Let us define some notation related to the structure of formal ex-
pressions. The subexpression relation v is the smallest reflexive transitive
relation over Exp containing M v (M,N), N v (M,N), M v {M}rN
and N v {M}rN for all M,N ∈ Exp and r ∈ Rnd. For an expression M ,
we denote:
keys(M) := {K ∈ Keys : K vM}
rns(M) := {r ∈ Rnd : {N ′}rN vM for some N ′, N ∈ Exp}
atoms(M) := keys(M) ∪ rns(M)
We call the elements of atoms(M) the atoms of M .
Intuitively, a formal pattern describes what an adversary is able to
see when looking at an expression. The elements P,Q of the set of formal
patterns Pat is defined by the following grammar:
P,Q ::= b (bit)
| K (key)
| (P,Q) (pair)
| {P}rQ (encryption)
| ¤r (undecryptable) .
Here, ¤r denote ciphertexts that are encrypted with a key that the ad-
versary does not know, and thus can not “see” inside. We use formal
random numbers to differentiate between these ciphertexts, and there-
fore we require that the formal random numbers used at encryptions be
different from formal random numbers used at undecryptables. Now, the
relation v, as well as the functions keys, rns and atoms are extended to
Pat. Finally, note that the sets rns(P ) and atoms(P ) also contain formal
random numbers at the undecryptables.
3 Computational interpretation
In the computational model, an encryption system is a triple of polynomial-
time algorithms (G, E ,D) working with bit-strings. Here, G and E are
probabilistic algorithms while D is deterministic. The key generation al-
gorithm G takes as input the security parameter n, represented in unary,
and returns a new key. The encryption algorithm E takes as input the
security parameter, a key and a plaintext and produces a corresponding
ciphertext. Since E is probabilistic, different invocations of E may return
different ciphertexts. Lastly, the decryption algorithm D takes as input the
security parameter, a key and a ciphertext and returns the corresponding
plaintext.
Let 0 be a fixed bit-string. We say that the encryption system (G, E ,D)
is type-0 secure [3] if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algo-
rithms A(·),(·) (with interfaces to two oracles), the difference of probabil-
ities
Pr[AE(1n,k,·),E(1n,k′,·)(1n) = 1 : k, k′ ← G(1n)]−
Pr[AE(1n,k,0),E(1n,k,0)(1n) = 1 : k ← G(1n)]
is negligible in n. A function is negligible if its reciprocal grows faster than
any polynomial. In [3], Abadi and Rogaway showed that type-0 security
is achievable under standard cryptographic assumptions.
Let (G, E ,D) be a type-0 secure encryption system, such that the
distribution G(1n) is the uniform probability distribution over {0, 1}`(n),
where ` is a fixed polynomial. Now, being type-0 secure guarantees that
the algorithm E is probabilistic, and thus we denote by Er the invocation
of E with random coin-flips r ∈ {0, 1}∗. Thus, if we fix r, the algorithm
Er is now deterministic. In the security definition, we assume the uniform
distribution of r.
Now, let x be a bit-string. A random oracle R is a machine that, on
query (1m, x), first checks whether it has been queried with the same val-
ues before. If this is the case, then it returns the same answer as before.
Otherwise, it proceeds as follows. First, the random oracle creates, uni-
formly and randomly, a bit-string y of length m. Then, the random oracle
records the query (1m, x) together with y, and then finally y is returned.
In the random oracle model [7], there is a single random oracle in the
world, while all other algorithms and machines are allowed to query this
oracle. To be able to translate a model in the random oracle world into a
real system, the random oracle needs to be replaced with some “random-
looking” function h. Thus, there is a leap of faith involved in applying the
results proved in the random oracle model to a real system. Nevertheless,
we can still be sure that if the real system is insecure, then this must be
caused by h not being a good approximation of R.
Now we are ready to give a computational interpretation to expres-
sions and patterns. With each P ∈ Pat we associate a family (indexed
by the security parameter) of probability distributions over bit-strings.
We denote that family by [[P ]]. Fig. 1 depicts the algorithm sampling the
n-th distribution in that family. First, Initialize(1n, P ) is run and then
Convert(1n, P ) is invoked.
algorithm Initialize(1n, P )
for all K ∈ keys(P ) do τ(K)← G(1n)
τbb ← G(1n)
for all r ∈ rns(P ) do τ(r) R∈ {0, 1}∗
algorithm Convert(1n, P )
if P is K ∈ Keys
return 〈τ(K), “key”〉
else if P is b ∈ Bool
return 〈b, “bit”〉
else if P is (P1, P2)
let x = Convert(1n, P1)
let y = Convert(1n, P2)
return 〈x, y, “pair”〉
else if P is {P2}rP1
let x = Convert(1n, P1)
let y = Convert(1n, P2)
let z = Eτ(r)(1n, R(1`(n), x), y)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
else: P is r
let z = Eτ(r)(1n, R(1`(n), τbb),0)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
Fig. 1. Algorithm sampling [[P ]]
Note that if P1 6= P2 then if we sample 〈x, y, “pair”〉 ← [[(P1, P2)]]n,
then the probability for x = y is negligible.
In fact, the existence of the random oracle is itself sufficient for the
existence of type-0 encryption systems. In particular, we could have fixed
the encryption system, for example, to the one given in [8]. However, we
would like to use the random oracle as little as possible and thus we have
not fixed it.
Two families of probability distributions over bit-strings D and D′
are indistinguishable (denoted D ≈ D′) if for all PPT algorithms A, the
difference of probabilities
Pr[A(1n, x) : x← Dn]− Pr[A(1n, x) : x← D′n]
is negligible in n. In fact, indistinguishability is the computational equiv-
alent of sameness.
4 Equivalence relation on Pat
We would like to define an equivalence relation ∼= over formal expressions
(and more generally, over patterns), such thatM ∼= N implies [[M ]] ≈ [[N ]].
Similarly to Abadi and Rogaway, we define a function pattern : Exp −→
Pat and state M ∼= N iff pattern(M) and pattern(N) can be obtained
from each other by an α-conversion over keys and formal random num-
bers. Even though we could also define the function pattern similarly
to [3], that is by giving the entailment relation ` (this relation describes
which formal expressions the Dolev-Yao attacker may obtain from a given
expression) and replacing the undecryptable encryptions in the expres-
sions by the corresponding “blobs” ¤, we chose to give a different equiv-
alence definition. The reason for this is that, if we followed Abadi and
Rogaway, then we would have to assume that the expressions M and N
do not contain encryption cycles. With atomic keys only, an encryption
cycle in an expression M is a sequence of keys K1, . . . ,Km, where Ki is
encrypted under Ki+1 (possibly indirectly) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} and
Km is encrypted under K1, all in the expression M . Even though the
definition of type-0 security does not say anything about the security of
encryption cycles; in systems where the Abadi and Rogaway results can
be applied, encryption cycles cannot occur. However, when considering
composed keys, the definition of encryption cycles is likely much more
contrieved, because the different parts of the same key have to be kept
track of. Therefore, we avoid defining the encryption cycles at all, and
thus our definition of ∼= applies to all expressions.
Let P,Q ∈ Pat. The operation boxQ(P ) replaces all encryptions of the
form {·}rQ occurring in P with undecryptables. Formally, the operation
boxQ(P ) is defined by
boxQ(b) = b
boxQ(K) = K
boxQ((P1, P2)) = (boxQ(P1), boxQ(P2))
boxQ({P2}rP1) =
{
¤r, if P1 = Q
{boxQ(P2)}rboxQ(P1), if P1 6= Q
boxQ(¤r) = ¤r .
We are looking for sufficient conditions for [[P ]] ≈ [[boxQ(P )]]. In particu-
lar, we are going to prove that the following is a sufficient condition. Let
TP be the set of all atoms occurring in P , except that if P has subex-
pressions of the form {·}rQ, then the keys and random numbers inside
that Q do not count. The sufficient condition that we are looking for is
atoms(Q) 6⊆ TP . To state this formally, we define the sets BQ(P ) for all
P ∈ Pat in the following way:
BQ(b) = ∅
BQ(K) = {K}
BQ((P1, P2)) = BQ(P1) ∪ BQ(P2)
BQ({P2}rP1) =
{
{r} ∪ BQ(P2), if P1 = Q
{r} ∪ BQ(P1) ∪ BQ(P2), if P1 6= Q
BQ(¤r) = {r}
and set TP := BQ(P ).
If the above condition is fulfilled we say that P ∼= boxQ(P ). We also say
P ∼= Q whenever Q can be obtained from P through some α-conversion
applied to its formal keys and random numbers. Finally, we extend ∼= to
an equivalence relation.
Now we are ready to define the function pattern. Let P ∈ Pat. If
there exists some Q ∈ Pat, such that P 6= boxQ(P ) (i.e. Q occurs
as an encryption key somewhere in P ) and P ∼= boxQ(P ) then we put
pattern(P ) := pattern(boxQ(P )). Otherwise we put pattern(P ) := P . It
is easy to check that pattern is well-defined. Furthermore, the function
pattern is efficiently computable.
5 Examples
Before going to the proof that equivalence implies indistinguishability of
interpretations, let us see some examples. We are not going to repeat the
examples given by Abadi and Rogaway [3]1. In our examples we intend
to illustrate and clarify what constitutes an “encryption cycle” in an
expression and what does not.
– {K1}r(K1,K2) ∼= ¤r. This is so since the atom K2 of the encryption key
(K1,K2) does not occur anywhere else.
1 The reader checking out these examples should keep in mind that:
– [3] uses no formal random numbers; each occurrence of the encryption constructor
is assumed to have a different formal random number attached to it;
– in [3], M ∼= N does not imply [[M ]] ≈ [[N ]], if M or N contains encryption cycles.
– {(K1,K2)}r(K1,K2) 6∼= ¤r. This expression is a clear-cut encryption cy-
cle. However, encryption cycles can be more subtle, as the next two
examples show.
– {(K2,K1)}r(K1,K2) 6∼= ¤r.
– ({K1}r1(K1,K2), {K2}
r2
(K1,K2)
) 6∼= (¤r1 ,¤r2).
– {{K2}r1K1}r{K2}r1K1 6
∼= ¤r, but {{K2}r2K1}r{K2}r1K1
∼= ¤r. The first example
contains an encryption cycle. The second example, however, does not,
because the atom r1 of the key does not occur anywhere else. These
two examples show the importance of formal random numbers.
– ({K1}r(K1,K2),K2) 6∼= (¤r,K2). Compared to the first example, the
addition of K2 means that now all atoms of the encryption key occur
somewhere else.
6 Correctness proof
Theorem. Let P,Q ∈ Pat, such that atoms(Q) 6⊆ BQ(P ). Then [[P ]] ≈
[[boxQ(P )]].
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. there is an algorithm A that can
distinguish the families of probability distributions [[P ]] and [[boxQ(P )]].
Fig. 2 shows an algorithm (first call Initialize and then Convert) sam-
pling either [[P ]] or [[boxQ(P )]], depending on the values of the oracles f
and g. If f and g are E(1n, k, ·) and E(1n, k′, ·), then the algorithm in
Fig. 2 samples [[P ]]. If f and g are both E(1n, k,0) then this algorithm
samples [[boxQ(P )]]. Composing this algorithm with algorithm A allows
us to break the type-0 security of the encryption system.
We have to show that the algorithm Convertf(·),g(·) can complete its
job, i.e. it does not have to access τ at a point where it is undefined. If a
keyK occurs in P but does not belong to BQ(P ) then this key only occurs
as a subexpression of Q, where Q is used as an encryption key in P . But
Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, Q,Q) is never needed in this context, the oracle f is
used instead of encrypting with it. Therefore we do not need the value
of K there. Similarly, if r ∈ Rnd occurs in P but not in BQ(P ) then
we would need it only for computing the interpretation of the encryption
key Q, which is not necessary to compute at all. If r belongs to the set
subtracted from BQ(P ) in the algorithm Initialize, then τ(r) is not used,
but the oracles f or g generate some random numbers of their own.
We have to argue that the algorithm in Fig. 2 indeed samples the
claimed families of distributions. Clearly, if f and g are both E(1n, k,0),
then Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q) samples [[boxQ(P )]]. If f is E(1n, k, ·) and
algorithm Initialize(1n, P,Q)
for all K ∈ BQ(P ) do τ(K)← G(1n)
for all r in the set
BQ(P )\
 {r′ ∈ Rnd |r′ occurs in P} ∪ {r′ ∈ Rnd | {·}r′Q occurs in P}
do τ(r)
R∈ {0, 1}∗
algorithm Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q)
if Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q) has been invoked before
return the value returned previously
if P is K ∈ Keys
return 〈τ(K), “key”〉
else if P is b ∈ Bool
return 〈b, “bit”〉
else if P is (P1, P2)
let x = Convertf,g(1n, P1, Q)
let y = Convertf,g(1n, P2, Q)
return 〈x, y, “pair”〉
else if P is {P2}rP1
if P1 = Q
let y = Convertf,g(1n, P2, Q)
let z ← f(y)
else
let x = Convertf,g(1n, P1, Q)
let y = Convertf,g(1n, P2, Q)
let z = Eτ(r)(1n, R(1`(n), x), y)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
else: P is r
let z ← g(0)
return 〈z, “ciphertext”〉
Fig. 2. Algorithm sampling either [[P ]] or [[boxQ(P )]]
g is E(1n, k′, ·) then we have to show that the key k used by f is indis-
tinguishable from R(1`(n),Convert(1n, Q,Q)) even when we are given
the values of τ on BQ(P ). The key used by f is independent of all the
given values of τ . Also, these values of τ do not uniquely determine
Convertf,g(1n, Q,Q) yet, because atoms(Q) 6⊆ BQ(P ). Even more, with
given values of τ we can guess the value of Convertf,g(1n, Q,Q) only
with negligible success probability. Therefore the application of the ran-
dom oracle to this value gives us a random bit-string that is indepen-
dent of the given values of τ . The key used by f and the bit-string
R(1`(n),Convert(1n, Q,Q)) are identically distributed, therefore they
are indistinguishable under given conditions. Hence we conclude that
Convertf(·),g(·)(1n, P,Q) samples [[P ]]. ¤
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered an extension of the work of Abadi and
Rogaway [3]. This extension is mainly constituted by considering the use
of composed, non-atomic keys in the encryption operator of the formal
language. Briefly, we proceeded as follows: First, we related formal ex-
pressions in our language with an equivalence relation ∼=. By providing
an intuitive computational interpretation, and then showing that each
time two formal expressions that are equivalent according to ∼= are also
indistinguishable in the computational world, we have lifted the work of
Abadi and Rogaway [3] to the case of composed keys.
As we already mentioned, support for encryption with composed keys
is important since many cryptographic protocols use them [14, 1, 12].
Thus, having the soundness result for the case of formal encryption with
composed keys provides further faithfulness in the verification results of
formal approaches that support composed keys (such as [18, 10, 4].)
While giving the computational interpretation, we needed to use the
random oracle. Thus, our approach gives less security guarantees than the
original work of Abadi and Rogaway, based on standard security assump-
tions. However, we believe the use of the random oracle is necessary to
guarantee the goodness and independence of the constructed keys. Usage
of the random oracle allow us to model the situation in which a user gener-
ates keys in a completely secure manner, which is in accordance with the
existing definitions in the computational model. However, in some situa-
tions (e.g. when considering composed keys), the key generation process
may not be a so private activity. In this new setting, an adversary might
have some knowledge about the randomness used during the key genera-
tion. Furthermore, a stronger and active adversary may even have some
control over the key generation process. We believe it would be interest-
ing to study such a new scenario, where new and proper definitions (and
constructions) would be needed.
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